Who signs the default JIL Wallet key? JIL does, after you authorize. The default service key is reconstructed on the server. JIL holds every share. You hold no signing shard. Non-custodial is accurate only for a hardware wallet or a Gnosis Safe whose owners you control.
Default keyServer-side signNo user shardHardware and Safe
A diagram shows three shards and one of them on the user's phone. A questionnaire asks the user to confirm a seed phrase. A policy says non-custodial because the user taps approve. A recovery screen asks for a shard the account never created.
Those are the signs.
The default key in JIL Wallet is a service key. You sign in, you authorize a transaction, and the live signing path reconstructs the signing secret on the server before it signs. There is no user-held shard on that path. All of the shares that the live path uses are generated and kept on the server. The reconstruction is Shamir sharing put back together with Lagrange interpolation, done where the server can see the full secret. It is not a non-interactive threshold protocol of the FROST or GG20 kind, in which each party produces a signature share and nobody reassembles the key.
That distinction is the whole article. In a real threshold protocol, the server cannot sign alone if it does not hold enough shares, and a user who holds a share is part of the mathematics. On the live default key the server holds the shares, reassembles the secret, and signs. Because the server holds enough shares to reconstruct, the server can sign alone in the cryptographic sense. The product still asks you to authorize, and it can refuse or delay a request that has not been signed. Authorization and refusal are policy. They are not the same thing as a mathematical inability to sign. This page will not pretend they are.
Do not describe the default key as a 2-of-3 arrangement in which you hold a shard. Do not describe it as you holding two shards while JIL holds one. That split is not what is built. A post-quantum cosigner runs beside the service key, with ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s material that rotates about every seven days. That rotation is not a user shard, and it is not a shard derived from a secret you hold. It is an attestation key on the company side. Naming it post-quantum does not move the signing secret into your pocket.
This is not classic self-custody. Classic self-custody means a secret you can carry off the platform, on a device or on paper you control, such that the platform cannot produce a signature by itself. The default key fails that test, and the company should not be quoted as if it passed. It is also not an exchange omnibus that freezes a balance by editing an internal ledger after the fact, and it is not a bank that reverses a payment through ACH. JIL is not a bank. There is no ACH. A sign that has already been produced is not reversed by a support ticket. A sign that has not been produced can be refused or delayed for identity, sanctions, or policy.
The paths that do meet the ordinary test are hardware wallets and Gnosis Safe. On a hardware wallet the device holds the key and you confirm on the device. On a Safe, the owners are addresses you control, the platform key is not allowed to be the only owner, and the Safe contract checks those owner signatures. Those paths are where you control keys. They are the non-custodial paths. The default service key is a different path, and wrapping coins does not move you from one path to the other.
Recovery language gets misread in the same way. The screen at /wallet/key-recovery is an illustration. Social recovery at /wallet/recovery starts empty until you add contacts. Neither screen is a user-held shard, and neither screen should be taught as a canned passphrase that rebuilds one. If you need a secret that survives the company, put it on hardware you keep, or behind a Safe whose owners you can still reach. Do not store that plan in a screenshot of a demo recovery page.
Search results are full of wallets that say the customer holds the keys while a server can sign. Boards, auditors, and families get hurt by that sentence later, not at signup. The useful sentence is the one you can still defend when someone reads the signer. On the default key, you authorize and the server reconstructs the secret. That is the sentence. Hardware and Safe are the alternatives when that sentence is not acceptable for the amount at stake.
The wallet host can refuse a sign that has not happened. JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated manages and operates getjil.com and wallet.getjil.com. It does not get to claim a user shard the signer does not implement. The same company operates the Layer-1 at jilsovereign.net. Sealed records and attestations are aimed at that chain. They record what the company says happened. They do not convert a server-reconstructed key into a key you hold. The Layer-1 is not EVM, so an Ethereum story about a personal account on that chain is the wrong picture. Ethereum is reached by a bridge.
JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated manages and operates getjil.com and wallet.getjil.com. JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated operates the Layer-1 host at jilsovereign.net under the license from JIL Sovereign Holdings, LLC (WY). The same company manages and operates this wallet. The software is owned by JIL Sovereign Holdings, LLC (WY). getjil.com and wallet.getjil.com are the two hostnames of this one app. Payment integrity, CREB, and AAVAE are JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated at jilsovereign.com. Payment integrity is the same company as the Layer-1 host and a different product. The same company manages and operates this wallet. The software is owned by JIL Sovereign Holdings, LLC (WY). JIL Sovereign Holdings, LLC (WY) owns the intellectual property and licenses it. Holdings is not the operator of this site. No foundation operates these hosts.
If you are parking a small amount and you accept a server-reconstructed key plus your authorization, say that, and use the vault as a vault. Hold is free. You pay in stablecoins when you wrap or unwrap. You do not pay with ACH. You do not become a bank customer.
If you are parking an amount you would not leave on an exchange, and you also would not leave it on a server that can reassemble the key, pair a hardware wallet or move the control into a Gnosis Safe. Then the signature path matches the sentence you want to tell. The command surface is where that status should stay visible, not buried under a marketing line.
Importing assets is free either way. Import does not change who can sign. Read the hardware and Safe article next if you are choosing a key path, and the vault article if you are choosing a job for the product. The job is safekeeping, not trading.
No. The live default key is reconstructed on the server. There is no user-held shard. You authorize a sign. That is policy, not a threshold share in your possession.
Cryptographically, the server holds enough shares to reconstruct the secret and can sign alone. The product still requires your authorization and can refuse an unsigned request. Those controls are not the same as a protocol where the server lacks the shares.
No. ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s material on the cosigner rotates about every seven days. That is company-side attestation material, not a shard you hold.
Hardware wallets, where the device confirms the signature, and a Gnosis Safe whose owners are keys you control. The platform key is not allowed to be the only Safe owner. The default service key is neither of those paths.
No. /wallet/key-recovery is an illustration. /wallet/recovery starts empty until you add contacts. Neither one is a user-held signing shard, and neither one changes the default key.
Keep reading the related guides, or open the product. Paths: wallet.getjil.com, getjil.com, Command, Wrap, Gnosis Safe, Hardware wallets. A person can write to support@jilsovereign.com.
JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated manages and operates getjil.com and wallet.getjil.com. JIL Sovereign Technologies Incorporated operates the Layer-1 host at jilsovereign.net.